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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF ALBION DPW EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-6066 
VILLAGE OF ALBION, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Village of Albion DPW Employees 
Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit.agreed upon by the parties and described ' 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-6066 -2 
Included: Laborer, Motor Equipment Operator, General Maintenance, Water 
Maintenance Worker, Sewage Treatment Plant Maintenance 
Mechanic, Water Treatment Plant Maintenance Mechanic, Auto 
Mechanic, Sewer Treatment Plant Operator, Water Treatment 
Plant Operator, Senior Sewage Treatment Plant Operator, Senior 
Water Treatment Plant Operator, Working Supervisor, and Water 
Treatment Plant Operator Trainee. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Village of Albion DPW. Employees Association. The duty 
to negotiate collectively includesthe mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment.-or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposalor require the making ofa concession. 
DATED: September 26, 2011 
Albany, New York 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
LOCAL 2, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
OPPORTUNITY CHARTER SCHOOL, 
Employer 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, 
AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
CASE NO. C-6064 
( 
Certification - C-6064 -2 
Included: Teachers, Teacher Leaders, Assistant Teachers, Learning 
Specialists, Consultant Teachers, Behavioral Specialists, Special 
Education Teachers, Coaches, Assistant Deans, Guidance 
Counselors and Social Workers. 
Excluded: CEO, Principal, Assistant Principals, Directors, Assistant Directors, 
Executive Assistants, Secretaries, Department Supervisors, Deans, 
Parent Coordinators, Business Managers, Operations Managers, 
Human Resource Consultants, School Aides and all other , 
employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, AFL-CIO. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, : 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 26, 2011 
Albany, New York 
SlMunrn-C 
Jerome Lefkowitz, CXs^rrnan 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
n STATE OF NEW YORK PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of • , 
GREECE UNIFORMED FIRE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- -
CASE NO. C-6049 
NORTH GREECE FIRE DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Greece Uniformed Fire Officers Association 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and described below, as their 
exclusive representative, for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-6049 page 2 
Included: Fire Captains and Lieutenants. 
Excluded: EMT/Laborers, Dispatchers and Firefighters. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Greece Uniformed Fire Officers Association. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September26,2011 
Albany, New York 
s Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RONALD GRASSEL, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NOS. U-30052 
&U-30189 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2, AFT, 
AFL-CIO, 
Respondent. 
RONALD GRASSEL, pro se 
DAVID BRODSKY (ALLISON S. BILLER, of counsel), for Board of 
Education of the City School District of the City of New York 
RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE (PAMELA PATTON FYNES, of counsel), 
for United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to the Board on purported exceptions by Ronald 
Grassel (Grassel) to an interim determination by an Administrative Law Judge 
r - . . 
(ALJ) denying his request to amend his charges to allege that the Board of 
Education of the City School District of the City of New York (District) violated 
§§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
allegedly disclosed that he has a disability, and that he is pursuing a claim of 
disability discrimination before the United States Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC). In addition, Grassel requests the Board to review.a.series 
Case No. U-30052 & U-30189 - 2 -
of additional procedural arguments, some of which were not part of his motion to 
the ALJ. The District opposes the exceptions, and it has filed a cross-motion 
seeking sanctions against Grassel pursuant to §212.40) of our Rules of 
Procedure (Rules). 
DISCUSSION 
Although Grassel has labeled his pleading as exceptions, we will treat it as 
a motion for leave to file exceptions pursuant to §212.4(h) of the Rules because it 
seeks interlocutory review of an ALJ's interim ruling. Such motions are granted 
only when a moving party demonstrates extraordinary circumstances.1' W.e are 
confident that Grassel is fully aware of this principle because we have cited it in 
our numerous prior decisions denying his earlier motions.2 
In the present cases, Grassel has not demonstrated extraordinary 
circumstances warranting the grant of leave to file exceptions. Many of the 
issues raised to Board were not included in his motion to the ALJ, and the ALJ's 
denial of his motion to add a claim against the District does not constitute 
extraordinary circumstances. 
In our last decision denying another of Grassel's motions for leave to file 
exceptions in Case No. 30052, we observed that: 
Grassel's repetitious motions burden the 
administrative process with unnecessary costs and 
delays. We reiterate that Grassel may face 
1
 State of New York (Division of Parole), 40 PERB P007 (2007). 
2
 UFT (Grassel), 43 PERB p045 (2010); UFT (Grassel), 43 PERB 1J3034 (2010); 
UFT (Grassel), 43 PERB 1J3033 (2010); UFT (Grassel) 32 PERB P071 (1999). 
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appropriate sanctions in the future under §212(j) of 
our Rules, if he continues his practice of filing 
vexatious motions and pleadings.3 
Despite this warning, Grassel's current application is a continuation of his 
pattern of behavior that is apparently aimed at delaying the conclusion of the 
administrative process concerning his two pending charges. However, we do not 
deem this application alone to be sufficient to constitute aggravated misconduct 
warranting the sanctions permitted under §212.4(j) of our Rules. Therefore, we 
deny the District's cross-motion for the imposition of sanctions at the present time 
without prejudice. We again, however, caution Grassel to refrain from filing 
similar meritless exceptions and motions or face the possibility of future 
sanctions.-
Based upon the foregoing, the motion by Grassel and the cross-motion by 
the District are denied. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: September26, 2011 '•" ' 
Albany, New York 
~/7 Jerome Le^owitz^Fiairperson 
^ ; Sheila S. Cole^ Member 
3
 UFT (Grassel), supra, note 2, 43 PERB1J3045 at 3161 (2010). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
COUNTY OF LIVINGSTON, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-29244 
-and-
LIVINGSTON COUNTY COALITION OF PATROL 
SERVICES, 
Respondent. 
DAVID W. LIPPITT, ESQ., for County of Livingston 
TREVETTE CRISTO SALZER & ANDOLINA (LAWRENCE J. ANDOLINA of 
counsel), for Livingston County Coalition of Patrol Services 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of County of Livingston (County) to a 
decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing-its charge that Livingston 
County Coalition of Patrol Services (COPS) violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public 
Employees Fair Employment Act (Act) by refusing to execute a final agreement 
containing the same terms set forth in a tentative agreement, which was executed and 
ratified by the parties. The at-issue language amended Article 10 of the prior collective 
bargaining agreement (agreement) through the insertion of the phrase'"full time" 
between "continuous" and "service" in that article. This amendment was one of many 
changes to Article 10 contained in the tentative agreement. 
The ALJ concluded that the addition of the phrase "full time" to Article 10 was 
substantive and that during the negotiations the parties had not discussed the change. 
Case No. U-29244 - - 2 -
This persuaded the ALJ that there had not been a meeting of minds concerning the 
change and, therefore, there was no agreement between the parties. 
The first proposal to have the phrase "full time" placed between "continuous" and 
"service" in Article 10 was in COPS' initial negotiation proposal. It was included in a 
complete proposed draft agreement prepared by COPS' negotiating team member Ron 
Huff, Jr. (Huff), which was prefaced by the statement that the draft agreement 
"[i]s intended to be accepted or rejected as a whole. Should 
it be rejected then the proposal is withdrawn in its entirety 
and we revert back to the proposals submitted on October 
14, 2008 and will continue to negotiate in good faith." 
The COPS' proposal was not accepted by the County, and the parties continued 
to negotiate until they reached a tentative agreement. They also agreed that County 
Personnel Officer Tish Lynn (Lynn), a member of the County's negotiating team, would 
•draft the tentative agreement, and would "clean up" the language of the expired 
agreement. Lynn prepared the tentative agreement, which contained multiple changes 
to Article 10, including insertion of the at-issue phrase. The modifications to Article 10 
were highlighted with track changes. 
COPS chief negotiator Randall Morris (Morris) approved the proposed changes 
contained in Lynn's draft and referred it to COPS' attorney, who also approved,it. It was 
then ratified by COPS' membership. Subsequently, Huff raised a question with Morris 
concerning the insertion of "full time" in the ratified agreement, which precipitated the 
latter's refusal to execute the final agreement. 
Lynn testified that insertion of the phrase "full time" in the tentative agreement 
was part of her "clean up" of the article. In support of this characterization, she testified 
. Case No. U-29244 - 3 - • 
on cross-examination that part-time unit members had never received pro-rated credit 
for retirement health care, and that the language change merely clarified the terms of 
the agreement. Indeed, Article 18 of the agreement specifies the rates of compensation 
of part-time employees, but explicitly provides that part-time employees are not entitled 
to "other allowable expenses or benefits provided in this agreement,..." except for 
retirement benefits provided according to state law. 
Lynn's testimony concerning the cosmetic nature of the change to Article 10 in 
the tentative agreement is undisputed in the record. Inclusion of the phrase "full time" 
was part of multiple cosmetic modifications she made to the article. COPS does not 
claim that those other modifications were substantive in nature. During the hearing, 
COPS did not offer any evidence explaining its original choice to include the very same 
phrase in its initial negotiation proposal, or why it considers that specific change to be 
substantive. Although Huff, the drafter of the COPS' original proposal, was present at. 
the hearing, he was not called as a witness. Considering his central role in placing the 
phrase "full time" in COPS' initial proposal, we draw a negative inference from his failure 
to testify.1 
- Based upon the evidence in this record, we conclude that the County's insertion 
of the phrase was in furtherance of the parties' agreement that Lynn would clean up the 
article. We find that there was a meeting of the minds concerning this change just as 
there was a meeting of minds with respect to the many other changes made to the 
1
 State of New York (Division of Parole), 41 PERB P033, n.15 (2008); County of Tioga, 
44 PERB 1J3016 (2011). 
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article by Lynn in the tentative agreement.2 In light of .our conclusion, we reverse the 
decision of the ALJ and find that COPS violated §20.9-a.2(b) of the Act by refusing to 
execute the final agreement. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that: 
1. Upon request of the County of Livingston, COPS shall execute the successor 
agreement incorporating the terms of the executed and ratified tentative 
agreement between the County of Livingston and COPS; 
2. Sign and post the attached notice at all physical and electronic locations 
customarily used by COPS to post notices to employees in its bargaining unit: 
DATED: September 26, 2011 
Albany, New York 
/Mviu. „ 
Jerome LerkowitzTChairman 
s Sheila S, Cole, Member 
2
 Union Springs Cent Sch Teachers Assn, 6 PERB 1J3074 (1973). 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the County of Livingston in the unit 
represented by the Livingston County Coalition of Patrol Services (COPS) that 
COPS will: 
1. Upon request of the County of Livingston, execute the successor agreement 
incorporating the terms of the executed and ratified tentative agreement 
between the County of Livingston and COPS. 
Dated By . . . . . . . 
. On behalf of the Livingston County 
Coalition of Patrol Services 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF BALDWINSVILLE, 
Charging Party, CASE NO. U-29453 
- and -
BALDWINSVILLE POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent. -
 ; 
BALDWINSVILLE POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, CASE NO. U-29481 
-and - . 
VILLAGE OF BALDWINSVILLE, 
. Respondent. 
HANCOCK & ESTABROOK, LLP (MELINDA BURDICK BOWE of counsel), 
for Village of Baldwinsville 
JOHN M. CROTTY, ESQ. for Baldwinsville Police Benevolent Association 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to the Board on exceptions filed by the Baldwinsville Police 
Benevolent Association (PBA) and cross-exceptions by the Village of Baldwinsville 
(Village) to portions of a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).1 
1
 43 PERB 114594(2010)! 
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On a stipulated record, the ALJ concluded, inter alia, in Case No. U-29453 that a 
portion of PBA's General Municipal Law (GML) §207-c proposal concerning 
continuation of benefits during the proposed light duty assignment appeal procedure is 
nonmandatory and ordered PBA to withdraw it from interest arbitration. The ALJ found, 
however, that PBA did not violate the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
submitting to arbitration portions of another proposal concerning call-in and call-out 
procedures and overtime distribution. In Case No. U-29481, the ALJ dismissed the 
charge alleging that the Village violated §209-a. 1 (d) of the Act by filing a response to 
the petition for compulsory interest arbitration that included the Village's proposal to. 
expand the anti-discrimination provision of the parties' expired agreement. 
EXCEPTIONS . ' 
In its exceptions, PBA asserts that the ALJ erred in finding that its demand for the 
continuation of benefits during the proposed GML §207-c light duty assignment appeal 
procedure is nonmandatory and dismissing PBA's charge that alleged that the Village 
violated §209-a. 1(d) of the Act by submitting to arbitration a proposal to expand the 
scope of the anti-discrimination provision of the expired agreement. 
In its cross-exceptions, the Village contends that the ALJ erred by failing to find 
that PBA violated §209-a.2(b) of the Act by submitting to arbitration portions of its 
proposals concerning call-in and call-out procedures and overtime distribution. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse, in part, and affirm, in part, the decision of the ALJ. 
Case Nos. U-29453 & U-29481 - 3 -
DISCUSSION 
We begin with PBA's exception challenging the ALJ's conclusion concerning its 
demand in §7.3 for the continuation of benefits pending an appeal under the proposed 
GML §207-c light duty assignment procedure, which states: 
Section 7. Light Duty Assignments 
1. Any Recipient may be examined by a physician chosen by the Village's 
designated agent(s) to determine the Recipient's ability to perform 
specified light duty. Any Recipient deemed able to perform specified light 
duty by the Village's designated agent(s), based upon medical 
documentation, may be directed by the Chief, in his/her sole discretion, to 
perform such specified light duty.2 
2. A Recipient may contest an order to report for specified light duty by 
submitting conflicting medical documentation to the Village's designated 
agent(s) within ten (10) calendar days of receipt of the order to report for 
specified light duty. The conflicting medical evidence may consist of a 
note or letter from a medical provider stating that a Recipient is unable to 
perform the specified light duty. The Village's designated agent(s) shall 
review the medical documentation, and within ten (10) calendar days of its 
receipt shall issue to the Chief and Recipient a decision as to whether the 
order to return to specified light duty should be confirmed, modified or 
withdrawn. If the Recipient is dissatisfied with the decision, he/she may 
request, in writing, a hearing to appeal from the decision within ten (10) 
calendar days after receipt of the Village's designated agent(s)' decision. 
The Village's designated agent(s) shall arrange for a hearing to be held 
pursuant to Section 11 of this procedure. 
3. Pending the hearing and determination thereon, the Recipient shall 
continue to receive his/her Section 207-c benefits set forth in this 
procedure. (Emphasis added.) 
4. Where a determination by a Hearing Officer has been made pursuant 
to Section 11 of this procedure that the Recipient can report to and 
perform the specified light duty, and that individual fails to report to 
perform the specified light duty, if same is available and offered, that 
employee's Section 207-c status shall be discontinued and the employee 
2 PBA has not filed an exception to the ALJ's conclusion that the secondxsentence in 
§7.1 is nonmandatory because it seeks to grant to the Chief of Police the sole discretion 
to direct a unit member to perform light duty. See, Highland Falls Patrolmen's 
Benevolent Association, Inc., 42 PERB P020 (2009). 
Case Nos. U-29453 & U-29481 - 4 -
shall be placed on sick or other paid leave as set forth in Section 5 of this 
procedure. 
5. No Recipient on specified light duty shall be assigned to perform work, 
a tour.of duty or training that is inconsistent with the injury or illness. In 
the event there are more light duty Recipient available on one (1) tour of 
duty, than can effectively utilized, the Chief may change the tour of duty to 
effectively utilize those on light duty assignment. In the event there are 
insufficient number of volunteers among those on specified light duty 
assignment for changed tours of duty, an involuntary assignment shall be 
done in the inverse order of seniority within rank. 
6. A Recipient who is working specified light duty, shall be entitled to all 
contractual benefits. 
7. A Recipient who is working specified light duty and is absent due to the 
injury or illness shall be granted Section 207-c status for the absence and 
shall not be charged sick or other paid leave for the absence based upon 
medical document [sic] that the absence is due. to the injury or illness. A 
Recipient denied Section 207-c benefits for the absence(s) may request a 
hearing pursuant to Section 11 herein, within ten (10) calendar days after 
receipt of notification from the Claims Manager that Section 207-c benefits 
will not be paid for the absence(s). 
8. The Employer shall not be required to establish or maintain any light 
duty assignment. 
In City of Middletown Police Benevolent Association,3 we concluded that a proper 
analysis concerning the negotiability of GML §207-c termination procedures under the 
Act must include consideration of constitutionally mandated due process requirements 
with respect to the deprivation of a protected property right. This recognition stems from 
•' • ' j 
prior Court of Appeals decisions with respect to GML §§207-a and 207-c procedures. 
3
 42 PERB 1J3022-, n. 35 (2009), vacated on other grounds, City of Middletown v City of 
Middletown PBA, 43 PERB JJ7002 (Sup Ct Albany County 2010) affd 81 AD3d 1238, 44 
PERB 1J7003 (3d Dept 2011). 
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In Schenectady Police Benevolent Association v New York State Pubic 
Employment Relations Board* a divided Court of Appeals affirmed our conclusion that 
an employer's decision to direct an employee to perform light duties under GML §207-c 
is a nonmandatory subject under the Act. At the conclusion of that the decision, 
however, the Court stated: 
Finally, it should be clear that the procedures for 
implementation of the requirements of General Municipal 
Law §207-c are not before us. Those procedures may or 
may not be subject to bargaining. For example, no reason 
. has been shown here why officers should not be permitted • 
the opportunity to obtain and have considered the views of 
their personal physicians as to surgery.5 
In Uniform Firefighters ofCohoes v City ofCohoes,6 the unanimous Court held that the 
continued receipt of GML §207-a benefits constitutes a property right and that 
termination of such benefits is, therefore, subject to procedural due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court, however, 
concluded that a due process hearing is not triggered 
"unless a firefighter on section §207-a status has brought 
that [light duty] determination into issue by the submission of 
a report by a personal physician expressing a contrary 
opinion. Once evidence of continued total disability has 
been submitted, we agree with the Appellate Division that 
the order to report for [light] duty may not be enforced, or. 
4
 City of Schenectady, 25 PERB 1J3022 (1992), confirmed sub nom. in part, and 
modified in part, Schenectady PBA v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 25 PERB 
fl7009 (Sup Ct Albany County 1992), affd, as modified, 196 AD2d171, 27 PERB1J7001 
(3d Dept 1994), affd, 85 NY2d 480, 28 PERB 1J7005 (1995). 
5
 Schenectady PBA v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, supra, note 4, 85 NY2d at 487, 
28 PERB 1J7005 at 7013. 
6
 94 NY2d 686 (2000). 
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benefits terminated, pending resolution of an administrative 
hearing, which itself is subject to review under CPLR."7 
In support of its due process ruling .the Court cited the above quoted dicta from 
Schenectady Police Benevolent Association v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd 
concerning the right of a police officer under GML §207-c to challenge an employer's 
directive to undergo surgery based upon a contrary medical viewpoint from the officer's 
personal physician.8 More recently, the Court recognized that the same due process 
protections are applicable to the termination of GML §207-c benefits.9 
In the present cases; we find that §7.3 of PBA's GML §207-c proposal seeks a 
contractual codification of a unit member's constitutionally protected property right of 
continued receipt of GML §207-c benefits after contesting a light duty assignment 
through the submission of contrary medical evidence. Based upon the foregoing, we 
reverse the ALJ's conclusion that §7.3 is nonmandatory under the Act. 
We, however, affirm the ALJ's finding that the Village's proposal to expand the 
scope of the anti-discrimination clause of the parties' expired agreement is mandatory. 
Under the Village's proposal, the anti-discrimination clause would state: 
7
 Supra, 94 NY2d at 692. 
8
 Under applicable precedent, there is little doubt that a proposal to replace 
constitutionally mandated due process procedures with full and binding arbitration 
concerning the termination of GML §207-c benefits is a mandatory subject of 
negotiations under the Act. See, Gilbert v Homar, 520 US 924 (1997); Cleveland Bd of 
EducvLoudermill, 470 US 532 (1985); Prue v Hunt,78 NY2d 364, 24 PERB 1J7540 
C\9M); Antinom v State, 49 AD2d 6, 8 PERB1J7513 (4th Dept 1975), affd40 NY2d 921, 
9 PERB 1J7528 (1976); Chalachan v. CityofBinghamton, 55 NY2d 989, 15 PERB 1J7519 
(1982); City of Watertown v New York Pub Empl Rel Bd, 95 NY2d 73, 33 PERB 1J7007 
(2000). However, this case does not raise the issue because the ALJ found that PBA's 
narrower proposed GML §207-c hearing procedure is mandatory, and the Village has 
not filed exceptions to that ruling. 
9
 Park v Kapica, 8 NY3d 302 (2007). 
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2.1 The parties agree not to discriminate against any person 
because of race, color, creed, national origin, gender, or any 
other category protected by federal or state law or because 
of membership or non-membership in the PBA. (Emphasis 
added) . 
Contrary to PBA's argument, the demand can not reasonably be interpreted as 
proposing a waiver of PBA's right to file improper practice charges under the Act or a 
waiver of the right of PBA and unit members to pursue discrimination and retaliation 
claims under federal and state laws in forums other than the negotiated 
grievance/arbitration procedure. Notably, the demand does not propose an election or 
choice of forums by PBA unit members. Therefore, the United States Supreme Court's 
holding in 74 Penn Plaza LLC v Pyett,™ our holding in Board of Education of the City 
School District of the City of Buffalo^ and our discussion in City of Cohoes,u 
concerning the mandatory nature of a proposed statutory waiver of statutory rights are 
not relevant to the Village's proposal. 
It is not necessary for us to address PBA's contention that the proposed new 
phrase in the expired agreement's anti-discrimination clause is nonmandatory under 
Professional Fire Fighters Association Inc, Local 274,1.A.F.F.™ In that decision, we 
concluded that a proposal seeking to reiterate statutory protections under §§209-a:1 (a) 
and (c) of the Act is nonmandatory. In the present case, the subject of antiunion animus 
10
 556 US 247, 42 PERB 1J7504 (2009). 
11
 22 PERB P047 (1989). 
12
 31 PERB P020 (1998), confirmed sub nom. Uniform Firefighters ofCohoes, Local 
2562 v Cuevas, 32 PERB 1J7026 (Sup Ct Albany County 1999), affd, 276 AD2d 184, 33 
PERB H7019 (3d Dept 2000). 
13
 10 PERB 1J3043 (1977). 
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is already contained in the expired anti-discrimination clause, and therefore, to the 
extent that the subject is nonmandatory, it is converted to mandatory under City of 
Cohoes.u In addition, we conclude that the remainder of the at-issue proposal is 
mandatory as well under City of Cohoes?5 because it proposes to grant additional 
contractual rights and remedies to PBA unit members concerning a plethora of 
additional categories of anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation rights emanating from 
federal and state laws. 
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the dismissal of Case No. U-29481. 
Next, we turn to the Village's cross-exception asserting that the following portion 
of PBA proposal §10.2 concerning call-in or call-out pay is nonmandatory: -
In the event the employee completes his/her work or task in 
less than the minimum herein...he/she shall be entitled to 
leave, and perform no other work or function, and be paid for 
the minimum hours set forth herein. l 
Following our review of the proposal, we reverse the ALJ's conclusion that the demand 
addresses the mandatory subjects of wages and hours of work. The PBA proposal is 
nonmandatory because it proposes to abridge the authority of the Village to make work 
assignments when an employee is at work and on the payroll.16 
Finally, we consider the Village's cross-exception challenging the. ALJ's 
conclusion that the following paragraph in the Special Events Staffing section of PBA 
• proposal §10.8 Overtime Distribution Procedure is a mandatory subject: 
14
 Supra, note 12. See also, City of New York, 40 PERB 1J3017 (2007). 
15
 31 PERB P020 (1998), confirmed sub nom. Uniform Firefighters of Cohoes, Local 
2562 v Cuevas, 32 PERB K7026 (Sup Ct Albany County 1999), affd, 276 AD2d 184, 33 
PERB 1J7.019 (3d Dept 2000). 
16
 See, Buchanan Police Ass'n, 29 PERB 1J3061 (1996). 
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In the event there are no or an insufficient number of 
volunteers ten (10) calendar days prior to the special event, 
the Chief of Police or designee shall assign an employee(s) 
as follows: 
(a) An employee who is scheduled to work patrol on that 
date shall be ordered first (1st); and if there is an 
insufficient number of employees ordered who were 
scheduled to work on that date, then, 
(b) An employee on his/her regularly scheduled day(s) off 
who works patrol shall be ordered next, starting with the 
least senior employee; and if there is an insufficient 
number of employees ordered to work who were on their 
regularly scheduled day(s) off[,] then the School 
Resource officer(s), then the Detective(s). 
According to the Village, this demand is nonmandatory because it would prohibit the 
Village from assigning employees on approved leave to work the day of a special event. 
As the Village acknowledges, however, the ALJ ruled that the following paragraph in 
§10.8, which contains the prohibition is nonmandatory, and directed PBA to withdrawit 
from arbitration. Accordingly, we affirm the ALJ's conclusion that the above-quoted 
demand is procedural in nature, and therefore mandatory. 
Based upon the foregoing, we grant the Village's cross-exception and affirm the 
decision of the ALJ, as modified. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: Case No. U-29453 is dismissed and PBA is 
ordered to withdraw the following portions of its proposals from interest arbitration: 
Proposal 8 - portions of the demand as set forth above and in the ALJ's 
decision [the sentence in §10.2 regarding call-in or call-out 
pay; the first sentence of §10.8 Overtime Distribution 
Procedure; the paragraphs entitled Tour of Duty Shortage(s) 
- Patrol Unplanned and Tour of Duty Shortage(s) - Patrol 
Planned; and 
within Special Events Staffing, the second and third 
sentences of the first paragraph, and the fifth and sixth 
paragraphs]; 
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Proposal 19 - §7 Minimum Staffing; 
Proposal 21 - §6 Rule, Regulation, Policy and/or Procedure 
Change(s); 
Proposal 24 -portions of the demand as set forth in the ALJ's 
decision [the second sentence of §7.1 (Chiefs 
authority as to GML §207-c light duty assignments); 
and 
§7.3 (benefits pending appeal)]. 
DATED: September 26, 2011 
Albany, New York 
Uj/L^T*!^^-
Jerome Lefkowifz, Chai-Fp^son 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 




BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent. 
BLOSSOM RANNIE, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-31140 
This;matter comes to the Board on exceptions by Blossom Rannie (Rannie) to a 
decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
dismissing a charge, as amended, alleging that the Board of Education of the City 
School District of the City of New York (District) violated §209-a.1 (a) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). Following receipt of the exceptions, Rannie was 
informed that the exceptions were deficient, pursuant §213.2 of the Rules of Procedure, 
because they were not accompanied by proof of service upon the District. Although 
granted additional time to do so, Rannie has not submitted such proof. 
THEREFORE, the exceptions are denied and the charge is dismissed. 
DATED: September 26,2011 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefkovyfe, Chakperson 
<2_ 
Sheila S:. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF MADISON and MADISON COUNTY SHERIFF, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-29872 
MADISON COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S POLICE 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Respondent. 
MADISON COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S POLICE 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-29926 
COUNTY OF MADISON and MADISON COUNTY SHERIFF, 
Respondent. 
HANCOCK & ESTABROOK, LLP (JOHN F. CORCORAN of counsel), for 
County of Madison and Madison County Sheriff 
JOHN M. CROTTY, ESQ., for Madison County Deputy Sheriffs Police 
Benevolent Association, Inc. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to the Board on exceptions filed by the Madison County 
Deputy Sheriff's Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (PBA) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that PBA violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it sought compulsory interest arbitration of 
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PBA's suspension without pay and sick leave proposals and dismissing PBA's claim 
that the County of Madison and Sheriff of Madison County (Joint Employer) violated 
§209-a.1(d) of the Act by submitting to interest arbitration a proposal to exclude from 
entitlement to retroactive pay unit employees not on the payroll at the time of contract 
ratification. 
DISCUSSION 
In Orange County Deputy Sheriff's Police Benevolent Association, Inc.^ (County 
of Orange), we reiterated that when deciding whether a particular proposal is directly 
related to compensation, and therefore arbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act, we 
will examine the proposal to determine whether its sole, predominant or primary 
characteristic is a modification in the amount or level of compensation under the test 
first articulated in New York State Police Investigators Association2 (State Police): 
The degree of a demand's relationship to compensation is 
measured by the characteristic of the demand. If the sole, 
predominant or primary characteristic of the demand is 
compensation, then it is arbitrable because the demand to 
that extent directly relates to compensation. A demand has 
compensation as its sole, predominant or primary 
characteristic only when it seeks to effect some change in 
amount or level of compensation by either payment from the 
State to or on behalf of an employee or the modification of 
an employee's financial obligation arising from the 
employment relationship (e.g., a change in an insurance 
copayment).3 [Emphasis in original.] 
1
 44 PERB H3023(2011). 
2
 30 PERB P013 (1997), confirmed sub nom., New York State Police Investigators 
Assn v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 30 PERB 1(7011 (Sup Ct Albany 
County 1997). 
3
 Supra, note 2, 30 PERB 1J3013 at 3028 (1997). 
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In County of Orange and in Tompkins County Deputy Sheriff's Association, Inc.4 
(County of Tompkins) we reaffirmed the holding in State Police that proposals limited to -
seeking an increase in the amount of accumulated leave without a wage reduction are 
not directly related to compensation, and are therefore nonarbitrable under §209.4(g) of 
the Act. Our reaffirmation of that holding stemmed primarily from the indisputable fact 
that when the Legislature amended §209.4(g) of the Act in 2004,5 it utilized the identical 
phrasing from former §209.4(e) of the Act concerning the arbitrability of subjects which 
the Board had interpreted in State Police.6 The historical background of the 2004 
amendment to §209.4(g) of the Act demonstrates an intent that the statutory inclusions 
and exclusions from interest arbitration should be interpreted consistent with the 
Board's analysis in State Police, which was decided seven years before the 
amendment. 
In the present case, PBA's sick leave proposal seeks to increase the 
accumulation of such leave without a modification in the overall compensation for unit 
members, and therefore it is nonarbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act. We reach the 
same conclusion with respect to PBA's suspension without pay proposal, which states: 
Clarify §11.2 - an employee cannot be suspended without 
pay for a period in excess of 30 calendar days when served 
with a notice of discipline and files [sic] grievance to contest. 
444PERB H3024(2011). 
5
 L 2004, c 63. 
6
 Four years following State Police, the Legislature amended §209.4(e) of the Act to 
delete that phrasing. L 2001, c 587. See, Town ofWallkill, 42 PERB1J3017 (2009), pet 
dismissed, 43 PERB H7005 (Sup Ct Albany County 2010). 
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In its brief, PBA acknowledges that this proposal seeks to ensure that the length 
of a disciplinary suspension without pay would be the same as that provided for under 
Civ Serv Law §75 procedures. It asserts, however, that the subject of the proposal is 
not "disciplinary procedures and actions," and therefore, is subject to compulsory 
interest arbitration under §209.4(g) of the Act. We find no merit to PBA's argument. 
While the proposal would change the amount or level of compensation of an employee 
suspended without pay at the time he or she is served with a notice of discipline, the 
issue of compensation in the proposal is inextricably intertwined with the contractual 
disciplinary procedures, a nonarbitrable subject under §209.4(g) of the Act.7 It is, 
therefore, a nonarbitrable demand under §209.4(g) of the Act. 
Finally, we deny PBA's exception to the ALJ's conclusion that the Joint 
Employer's retroactivity proposal is arbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act. We reject 
PBA's contention that such a proposal constitutes a prohibited subject for the same 
reasons set forth in our decision in County of Tompkins.8 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny PBA's exceptions and affirm the ALJ's 
decision, as modified. 
7
 Based upon our decision in County of Orange, supra, note 1, we find merit to PBA's 
exception that challenges the ALJ's reference to the potentiality of compensation as a 
constituting a rationale for finding the proposal nonarbitrable. In County of Orange, we 
overruled prior Board precedent, which had held that proposals seeking "potential" 
compensation were nonarbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act. Therefore, we modify the 
ALJ's decision accordingly. 
Supra, note 4. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that PBA withdraw its suspension without pay 
and sick leave proposals from interest arbitration, the remainder of Case No. U-29872 is 
dismissed, and Case No. U-28483 is dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: September 26, 2011 
Albany, New York 
'/jQunrHS-^ 
Jerome Lefkowitz, Chairman 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of' 
COUNTY OF MONROE, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASENO.U-31129 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent. 
HARRIS BEACH PLLC (KARLEE S. BOLANOS of counsel), for Charging 
Party 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (PAUL S. BAMBERGER and 
KARA L. HILBURGER of counsel), for Respondent 
INTERIM BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
• This matter comes to the Board on a motion by Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) pursuant to §204.4(a) of the 
Rules of Procedure (Rules) for an expedited determination of an improper practice 
charge filed by County of Monroe (County) alleging that CSEA violated §209-a.2(b) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by introducing proposals at fact-
finding that are substantially different from CSEA's last stated position during the course 
of negotiations between the parties. CSEA's motion for an expedited determination and 
the County's opposition to the motion were transferred to the Board by the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director). 
In support of its motion, CSEA asserts that the County's charge concerns 
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primarily a disagreement over the scope of negotiations. Furthermore, it claims that the 
parties had engaged in package bargaining, the proposals it submitted to fact-finding 
were fully encompassed in its prior proposals during negotiations, and that any further 
delays in completing the impasse process may be harmful to the parties, and their 
relationship. 
The County opposes CSEA's motion on the grounds that the charge does not 
concern a disagreement over the scope of negotiations as required by §209.4(a) of the 
Rules. Rather, it contends that its charge alleges that CSEA violated its duty to 
negotiate in good faith under §209-a.2(b) of the Act by seeking to introduce new and 
revised proposals at fact-finding, and the County denies that the parties had been 
engaged in package bargaining. 
Following our careful review of the parties' respective submissions, we deny 
CSEA's motion for an expedited determination. The procedure set forth in §204.4(a) of 
the Rules was established primarily to create a means for a party to seek an expedited 
determination concerning whether particular proposals are mandatory, permissive or 
prohibited.1 
In the present case, we conclude that the factual and legal issues raised by the 
charge should be fully addressed by the parties before an ALJ prior to the issues being 
presented to the Board. First, it is not disputed that the County's charge does not seek 
1
 See, Professional Staff Congress/CUNY, 7 PERB 1J3028 (1974); Queensbury Union 
Free Sch Dist, 9 PERB 1J3057 (1976); State of New York (Unified Court System), 23 
PERB 1J3057 (1990); Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn, 37 PERB 1J3033 (2004): 
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a final determination concerning whether one or more of the proposals submitted by 
CSEA to fact-finding are nonmandatory or prohibited. In addition, a merits 
determination with respect to the charge will require a factual hearing concerning 
whether the parties' engaged in package bargaining and whether CSEA's submission of 
its proposals to fact-finding violated its duty to negotiate in good faith. An expeditious 
resolution of those issues might be substantially enhanced through a stipulation of facts, 
and a stipulated record. 
Based upon the foregoing, CSEA's motion is hereby denied, and the matter is 
remanded to the Director for further processing of the County's charge. 
SO ORDERED. . 
DATED: September 26, 2011 
Albany, New York 
Jerome LefkoWftz, Chaifp'erson 
<2^ 
s Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DEER PARK TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, 
AFT, NEA, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-28842 
-and-
DEER PARK UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
WILLIAM OQUENDO, LABOR RELATIONS SPECIALIST, for Charging Party 
COOPER, SAPIR & COHEN, PC. (ROBERT E. SAPIR of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to this Board on exceptions filed by Deer Park Union Free 
School District (District) to an Administrative Law Judge.(ALJ) decision finding that the 
District violated §209-a.1(e) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when 
it failed to grant vertical step increments on September 5, 2008 to unit employees 
represented by Deer Park Teachers' Association, NYSUT, AFT, NEA, AFL-CIO 
(Association) pursuant to the terms of the July 1, 2005-June 30, 2008 District-
Association collectively negotiated agreement (agreement).! The Association's charge 
was determined upon a stipulated record in lieu of a hearing. 
FACTS 
Article VII of the parties' agreement states, with respect to vertical steps: 
1
 43 PERB 1J4553 (2010). 
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Effective July 2, 2005, all eligible teachers shall move one 
.vertical step on the salary schedule; 
Effective July 2, 2006, all eligible teachers shall move one 
vertical step on the salary schedule; 
Effective July 1, 2007, all eligible teachers shall move one 
vertical step on the salary schedule; 
This shall not affectthe ability of the District to utilize Appendix 
II Section 2.2 
It is undisputed that on August 29, 2008 the parties reached a memorandum of 
understanding for a successor agreement for the period July 1, 2008 to June 30, 2011. 
Paragraph 4 of the memorandum stated "Effective July 1, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011, 
each eligible teacher will move up one step in the salary schedule." The Association's 
membership ratified the memorandum on or about-September 4, 2008. On September 
5, 2008, the District made salary payments to unit members that did not include any 
vertical step movement. After the District ratified the memorandum on or about 
September 9, 2008, all eligible unit members were moved one vertical step on the 
salary schedule effective July 1, 2008, and they were compensated accordingly. 
The Association's central allegation is set forth in paragraph h of its details of 
charge: 
h) That on September 5, 2008 the District engaged in an 
improper practice within the meaning of Section 209-a. 1(e) of 
the Public Employee's Fair Employment Act when the district 
2
 In her decision, the ALJ cites the following sentence in Appendix II, §2 in the parties' 
1974-76 agreement: "Board of Education may with the recommendation of the District 
Principal, withhold all automatic increments or hold any teacher on step, or both, within 
the provisions of the Law of New York State." Based upon our conclusion that the 
Association failed, a matter of fact, to prove that the District violated §209-a.1(e) of the 
Act, it is not necessary for us to determine the import, if any, of this provision. 
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knowingly and intentionally refused to advance all eligible 
members of the Association the step increments as provided 
for under the collective bargaining agreement. (Emphasis 
added) \ • 
DISCUSSION 
Section 209-a.1(e) of the Act makes it an improper practice for an employer 
to refuse to continue all the terms of an expired agreement 
until a new agreement is negotiated, unless the employee „. 
organization which is a party to such agreement has, during 
such negotiations or prior to such resolution of such 
negotiations, engaged in conduct violative of subdivision one 
of section two hundred ten of this article. (Emphasis 
supplied) 
Based upon our review of the stipulated record, we find no evidence 
demonstrating that the expired agreement imposed upon the District a contractual 
obligation to advance unit members a vertical step or make payment for such 
advancement on September 5, 2008. The only relevant dates in the expired agreement 
are the three effective dates for vertical advancements: July 1, 2005, 2006 and 2007. 
In light of the failure of the Association to prove that the expired agreement obligated 
the District to advance eligible employees on September 5, 2008 or was obligated to 
make payment for advancement on a specific date, we dismiss the Association's 
charge. 
If the Association had demonstrated a past practice of the District making vertical 
step payments on July 1 or another specific date, that might have evidenced a statutory 
obligation of the District under §209-a.1(e) of the Act to continue the timing of those 
payments. Alternatively, an enforceable past practice of providing vertical step 
payments'on a specific date or an ascertainable time might have evidenced a violation 
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of §209-a.1 (d) of the Act under the Triborough doctrine.3 However, neither alternative 
theory was plead nor proven by the Association. In fact, the ALJ specifically found that 
the parties' practice regarding the date of payment of the vertical step increment is 
equivocal. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is reversed and the charge is 
dismissed. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is 
dismissed. 
DATED: September 26, 2011 
Albany, New York 
Sheila S. Cole', Member 
3
 Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, 5 PERB H3037, aff'g 5 PERB 1J4505 (1972). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 






UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2, 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL^CIO, 
Respondent, 
- and -
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Employer. , 
RENEE MORRELL, pro se 
RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE, GENERAL COUNSEL (ANTONIO M. 
CAVALLARO of counsel), for Respondent 
: DAVID BRODSKY, DIRECTOR OF LABOR REALTIONS AND COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING (ALLISON SARA BILLER of counsel), for Employer 
• '. BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Renee Morrell (Morrell) 
to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)1 on two improper practice charges 
filed by her against the United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, American Federation of 
1
 44 PERB H4538(2011). 
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Teachers, AFL-CIO (UFT). The Board of Education of the City School District of the 
City of New York (District) is a statutory party pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
In Case No. U-30015, Morrell alleges that UFT violated §209-a.2(c) of the Act by 
its failure to timely respond to her letters and by its handling of a grievance challenging 
the failure of a Education Law §3020-a disciplinary arbitrator to issue a decision within 
the timeframe set forth in the District-UFT collectively negotiated agreement 
(agreement). In Case No. U-30016, Morrell claims that UFT violated §209-a.2(c) of the 
Act by its failure to respond to subsequent communications and by its handling of her 
grievance challenging the District's failure to provide her with a probable cause hearing 
as-part of the disciplinary process. 
The charges were consolidated for hearing before an ALJ. Following that 
hearing, the ALJ issued a decision dismissing both charges, concluding that Morrell 
failed to demonstrate that UFT breached its duty of fair representation. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In her exceptions, Morrell contends that the ALJ erred in concluding that UFT did 
not breach its duty of fair representation by its delay in responding to her letters, by its 
delay in filing a grievance challenging the disciplinary arbitrator's failure to issue a timely 
decision, and its subsequent decision not to further process the grievance on the basis 
of mootness. In addition, Morrell argues the ALJ erred when she found that the 
grievance filed by UFT encompassed her age discrimination claim in addition to her 
other claims and that UFT had no duty to pursue a claim on her behalf under the Age 
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Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).2 Finally, Morrell asserts that the ALJ erred 
in determining that UFT did not violate its duty of fair representation when it refused to 
process a second grievance challenging the lack of a probable cause hearing during the 
disciplinary process. 
Based upon our review of the record, and after consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we deny Morrell's exceptions and affirm the ALJ's decision dismissing both 
charges. 
FACTS 
Morrell was hired as a teacher by the District in 1993. In July 2006, she was 
involved in an alleged incident which resulted in the District issuing Education Law 
§3020-a disciplinary charges seeking her termination. During the pendency of the 
charges, Morrell was reassigned from her teaching duties and placed in the District's 
Reassignment Center in Manhattan, without any change in salary. 
Under the agreement, an employee may. be suspended without pay for a period 
not to exceed two months pending the outcome of the disciplinary process if the District 
demonstrates to an arbitrator that there is probable cause to believe that the employee 
engaged in serious misconduct. In the present case, it is undisputed that a probable 
cause hearing was not held, and the District did not suspend Morrell without pay. The 
agreement also requires that a final written arbitral decision and award concerning the 
disciplinary charges be issued within 30 days after the final hearing date. 
The disciplinary hearing concluded on February 5, 2010. On April 1, 2010, 
Morrell sent a letter, labeled "Grievance," to Howard Solomon (Solomon), UFT's 
2
 29 USC §§621-34. 
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Grievance Department Director. The letter listed Zena Burton-Myrick (Burton-Myrick), 
UFT's representative for members reporting to the Reassignment Center, and other 
UFT representatives as.additional recipients. In her letter, Morrell complained that the 
disciplinary arbitrator had not issued a decision within thirty days as required by the 
agreement, and that the arbitrator's tardiness constituted a violation of the ADEA. 
Although Morrell's letter to UFT was labeled as a grievance, contract grievances . 
under the agreement must be filed with the District and not UFT. A UFT member must 
file.the grievance with his or her building principal or in the alternative with the 
Chancellor's Office. Mary Atkinson (Atkinson) is the UFT representative responsible to 
provide assistance in the filing of grievances with the District for unit members who work 
in schools located in Manhattan. 
On April 17, 2010, Morrell sent a letter addressed to M,ark Collins (Collins) as 
director of UFT's Advisory Committee complaining that Solomon had not responded to 
her April 1, 2010 letter and asserting the same issues contained in that letter. Like her 
earlier letter,- Morrell's letter to Collins was labeled a grievance. The Advisory 
Committee is a UFT body that determines appeals by UFT members to decisions not to 
proceed with a grievance. In her letter, Morrell requested a meeting with the Advisory 
Committee to discuss her complaints. It is undisputed that Collins is not the Director or 
a member of the Advisory Committee, but has sat on the Committee in the past. On 
April 27, 2010, Morrell sent a third letter, designated as a grievance, to Solomon, which 
reiterated her claims that the arbitrator's failure to issue a timely decision violated the 
agreement and constituted unlawful discrimination. At the conclusion of the letter, 
Morrell complained that she had not received a response from UFT concerning her prior 
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\ letters. However, during the heaping before the ALJ, Morrell acknowledged that Burton-
Myrick spoke with her and repeatedly requested copies of the grievances. 
On May 1, 2010, Morrell sent Solomon a fourth letter stating that she was filing 
an additional grievance alleging that the District violated the agreement by denying her 
a probable cause hearing. On May 4, 2010, Morrell emailed Collins requesting an 
emergency Advisory Committee meeting to examine her pending grievances. 
The disciplinary arbitrator issued his decision and award on May 2, 2010 
sustaining the disciplinary charges against Morrell and the penalty of dismissal. On 
May 4, 2010, Burton-Myrick sent Morrell's May 1, 2010 letter to UFT representative 
Atkinson requesting that Atkinson assist Morrell jn the filing of her grievances. 
Thereafter, Atkinson contacted Solomon and obtained Morrell's April 1, 2010 letter. 
, On May 5, 2010, Atkinson filed two step 1 grievances with the District on behalf 
of Morrell. The first alleged violations of the agreement based upon the failure of the 
arbitrator to issue a timely decision and award. The grievance also asserted that the 
arbitrator's failure to issue a timely decision and award constituted age discrimination. 
The second grievance alleged that Morrell was improperly denied a probable cause 
hearing. On the same day that the grievances were filed, UFT sent lettersto Morrell 
informing her of the filings. 
On May 12* 2010, UFT requested the scheduling of a step 2 conference with the 
District regarding her first grievance. UFT, however, did not request a conference 
concerning the second grievance after it determined that the grievance lacked merit 
because Morrell had not been suspended without pay. This merits-based determination 
was made following consultation with a UFT attorney. UFT sent Morrell a letter 
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informing her of its decision and detailing how she could appeal it. Morrell, however, 
claims that she never received the UFT letter. 
At the May 25, 2010 step 2 conference concerning the first grievance, Morrell's 
UFT special representative determined that the grievance was moat because the 
arbitrator had, issued his decision and award. Therefore, the grievance was not further 
processed by UFT. 
DISCUSSION 
In order to prove that UFT breached its duty of fair representation, Morrell was' 
required to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that UFT's conduct was 
discriminatory, arbitrary, or in bad faith.3 The ALJ found that Morrell failed to meet her 
burden. We agree. . 
The ALJ concluded that UFT's relatively short delay in responding to Morrell's 
letters, and its related delay in filing the first grievance with the District were not based 
upon arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith conduct by UFT representatives. Rather, the 
ALJ determined that the delays were the direct result of confusion caused by Morrell's 
letters and that the delays constituted a mere error. The record supports this factual 
finding. s 
Instead of filing step 1 grievances withthe District through the established 
grievance procedure, Morrell chose to create a procedure of her own by sending letters 
designated as grievances to UFT representatives who are not generally involved in the 
initial processing of grievances. The record demonstrates that UFT representative 
Burton-Myrick made repeated contact with Morrell to clarify the status of those 
3
 CSEA vPERB and Diaz, 132 AD2d 430, 20 PERB 1J7024 (3d Dep't 1987), affirmed on 
other grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB 1J7017 (1988). 
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"grievances." Thereafter, Burton-Myrick referred the matter to Atkinson who promptly 
filed the step 1 grievances on Morrell's behalf. Under the facts and circumstances of 
the present cases, we conclude that UFT responded to Morrell's 2010 letters and filed 
her grievances within a reasonable period of time and therefore did not breach its duty 
of fair representation.4 
We reach a similar conclusion regarding UFT's processing of Morrell's 
grievances. Under the Act, UFT is entitled to a broad range of reasonable discretion in 
the processing of grievances, and we will not substitute our judgment concerning the 
merits of a grievance to an employee organization's reasonable interpretation of the 
agreement.5 
The record reveals that UFT discontinued pursuing Morrell's first grievance at the 
step 2 conference after concluding that issuance Of the arbitrator's decision and award 
rendered the grievance moot under the agreement. We find this determination was well 
within UFT's discretion under the Act. . 
Contrary to Morrell's contention, UFT did not violate its duty of fair representation 
in its handling of her claim that the arbitrator's delay in issuing a decision and award 
was motivated by age discrimination. While the grievance did not allege that the 
4
 1199 SEIU United Healthcare Workers East (Rowe), 42 PERB 1J3010 (2009); DC 37 
(Maltsev), 41 PERB P022 (2008); Nassau Educ Chapter of Syosset Cent Sch Dist Unit, 
CSEA, Inc (Marinoff), 11 PERB 1J3010 (1978). 
5
 UFT, Local 2 and Bd of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York (Jenkins), 41 
PERB P007 (2008), confirmed sub nom. Jenkins v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 
41 PERB 1J7007 (Sup Ct NY County 2008), affd, 67 AD3d 567, 42 PERB 1J7008 (1st 
Dept 2009) mot forivto app den, 43 PERB 1J7003 (1st Dept 2010); DC 37 (Maltsev), 
supra note 4; CSEA (Owens), 27 PERB 1J3004 (1994); Hauppauge Sch Office Staff 
Assn (Haffner), 18 PERB 1J3029 (1985). 
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arbitrator breached Morrell's statutory rights under the ADEA, the nondiscrimination 
article of the UFT-District agreement does not provide for the grieving.of statutory 
discrimination claims, and the article is inapplicable to the conduct of an arbitrator.6 In 
addition, there is no record evidence that Morrell presented UFT with facts that would 
support even a prima facie case that the arbitrator's delay was motivated by age 
discrimination.7 Finally, Morrell has not demonstrated that UFT has successfully 
pursued similar claims of alleged unlawful discrimination by an arbitrator on behalf of 
other unit members.8 Therefore, we find that the withdrawal of the age discrimination 
component of the grievance did not breach UFT's duty of fair representation. 
With respect to Morrell's second grievance; the evidence demonstrates UFT 
made a merits-based determination, after consultation with a UFT attorney, not to 
process the grievance beyond step 1 because she was not suspended without pay, and 
therefore was not entitled to a probable cause hearing under the agreement.9 UFT 
sent Morrell a letter on May 12, 2010 informing her of its decision and detailing its 
internal appeal process. Contrary to Morrell's arguments, the record does not provide 
any support for her claimed contractual right to a probable cause hearing or her 
assertion that UFT had knowledge that she did not receive the May 12, 2010 letter. 
Based upon the foregoing, Morrell's exceptions are denied and the ALJ's 
decision is affirmed. 
< 
6
 Transcript, pp. 123-124. 
7
 See, Hazen Paper Co v Biggins, 507 US 604 (1993). 
8
 United Steelworkers, Local 9434-00 (Buchalski), 43 PERB 1J3002 (2010). 
9
 DC 37 (Maltsev), supra note 4. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charges must be, and are hereby 
dismissed. 
DATED: September 26, 2011 
Albany, New York 
tcz^ 
Sheila S. Cole\ Member 
